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Abstract 
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about 
production costs? In order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into 
account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and 
it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defec t. For 
private cost uncertainty we charac terize the set of cartel agreements with 
side payments that can be supported as Bayesian Nash equilibria. We show 
that if defection results in either Courno t or Bertrand competition the 
incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel 
from achieving the monopoly outcome . In contrast, with common cost 
uncertainty, the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels, 
allowing perfec t collusion. 
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1. Introduction 
Several firms are interested in forming a cartel in the hopes of 
improving profitability within the industry . Although the output of every 
firm is j ointly observed, each firm has private information about its own 
production costs .1 For an industry with linear demand and linear production
costs, we characterize the set of cartel agreements (called enforceable 
cartels) that can be supported by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium . We assume 
that side-payments among firms are possible . Thus, a low-cost firm is able 
to bribe a high-cost firm into not producing . The bribery, however, is 
complicated by the incomplete information, since the firms may have an 
incentive to misrepresent their costs . A firm that feels it is likely that 
it has the lowest cost in the industry may be tempted to understate the size 
of the industry profits by overstating its costs, whereas a firm with higher 
costs prefers to understate its costs so as to overstate its willingness to 
produce. 
The set of enforceable cartels depends in a crucial way on what happens 
if the firms cannot agree on an allocation mechanism. We assume that if one 
firm refuses to join the cartel, the cartel breaks down resulting in either 
Cournot or Bertrand competition among all the firms in the industry . These 
outcomes in the face of disagreement determine each firm's individual 
rationality constraint. This is a relatively weak form of individual 
rationality, since it assumes the firms are able to commit to relatively 
aggressive noncooperative behavior if one firm refuses to participate. 
Alternatively, one might consider a stronger form of individual 
rationality in which if one firm refuses to join, the n - 1 remaining firms
1Related studies with uncertainty about production costs have focused
primarily on regulatory issues . See, for example, Baron and Besanko [1984), 
Baron and Myerson ( 1982), Laffont and Tirole (1984), Loeb and Magat [1979), 
and Riordan and Sappington [ 1985). 
continue as a cooperative cartel so that the industry looks more like a 
duopoly. C learly, the less competitive is the behavior of the remaining 
n - 1 firms, the stronger the individual rationality constraint becomes.
Thus, if we instead assumed the n - 1 remaining firms adopted the j oint
profit maximizing outcome in the face of a deviating firm, then the 
individual rationality constraint would be more severe and the set of 
enforceable cartels would be greatly reduced. 
With complete information it is easy to sustain the monopoly outcome via 
an enforceable cartel�simply have the lowest-cost firm produce the monopoly 
output and pay the other firms at least their Cournot or Bertrand profits. 
But with incomplete information, the monopoly outcome may not be enforceable 
due to the firms' incentives to misrepresent their true costs. Our main ' 
result is that when there are sufficiently many firms in the industry, the 
monopoly outcome is unobtainable, even with the weak individual-rationality 
constraint given by our Cournot or Bertrand assumption. This result is in 
agreement with conventional wisdom that suggests as the number of firms 
grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the cartel. 
In our model, the difficulty arises as a result of asymmetric 
information. Simply put, with more firms, a greater amount of surplus is 
needed, since both producing and nonproducing firms have to be subsidized. 
We require that the aggregate subsidy cannot exceed the total (ex post) 
revenue generated by the cartel. 
Although intuitive, the result does have some bite, since aside from the 
incomplete information about costs, our setting�symmetry, side-payments, 
full information about quantities and other data, and an ability to commit to 
an allocation mechanism�tends to favor efficient cartels. Hence, even when 
it is possible for the firms to establish binding agreements with side-
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payments, the firms' incentives to misrepresent production costs precludes 
the formation of a cartel that attains the monopoly outcome. 
Finally, we consider the effect of common cost uncertainty on the 
ability for a group of firms to successfully collude. By "common" we mean 
that all firms have identical but unknown cost functions and each firm has a 
private signal which is informative about these costs. For this case we do 
not characterize the optimal mechanism in general. Instead, we find a 
specific mechanism which achieves the monopoly outcome if there are enough 
firms. This result is established for a very broad class of disagreement 
games, specifically, all games which satisfy a particular uniformity 
property. This contrasts sharply with the results for private cost 
uncertainty. 
Cartel agreements of the sort analyzed here are typically illegal in a 
domestic industry, because of their negative welfare affects. However, in 
export industries, governments would tend to encourage cartel arrangements, 
since the exporting nations are solely interested in maximizing producer 
surplus. Therefore, we might expect some degree of cartel formation 
involving side-payments to exist in export industries with few firms, such as 
precious commodity production (diamonds and platinum) , or in countries 
specializing in the export of a single agricultural commodity. 
Before presenting our model, we want to emphasize that there are many 
alternative ways to pose the cartel problem when there is asymmetric 
information. A few possibilities have been mentioned above (side-payments 
vs. no side-payments; different assumptions about what happens when the 
cartel falls apart�leading to different specifications of the individual 
rationality constraints; the degree to which the cartel members are required 
3 
to commit to the rules of the cartel).2 What we have tried to do is make 
assumptions which are conducive to the successful formation of efficient 
cartels. What we have shown is that, even within this favorable environment, 
if firms have private information about costs, a cartel cannot successfully 
enforce the monopoly outcome when there are many firms. We have, however, 
ignored dynamic aspects of cartel enforcement. A repeated game model of 
competition might well expand the set of enforceable cartels. 3 
We begin by formulating the model and analyzing the direct revelation 
game. Then in Section 3 the two alternative threats (Cournot or Bertrand 
competition) are studied. In Section 4, we give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a cartel to attain the monopoly outcome, and in Section 5 the 
case of uniform uncertainty is worked out to demonstrate that the monopoly 
outcome is not attainable by an enforceable cartel when there are too many 
firms. Section 6 analyzes cartel enforcement for a model in which each firm 
has a private signal about a common industry production cost. Final ly, in 
Section 7 we discuss some extensions and alternative formulations of our 
model. 
2. The Revelat ion Game
An industry consists of n firms indexed by i E N  - (1, . . .  , n) , Each
firm in the industry produces the quantity q1 of a homogeneous good and 
incurs linear production costs c1q1• The market price for the good depends
2See Roberts [1983,1985] for an analysis of cartel enforcement without 
side payments. 
3For dynamic studies of collusive behavior, see Abreu [1986], Abreu, 
Pearce, and Stacchetti [1986], Fudenberg and Maskin [1986], Green and Porter 
[1984], and Porter [1983]. 
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on industry output q = {q1, . . .  , qn} as given by the linear inverse demand
P(q) = a  - l qi . 4 The output of each firm is j ointly observable, but a
firm's variable cost ci is known privately. Other firms know only that the 
private cost parameter of firm i is drawn independently from the continuous 
distribution F, which has a positive density f on [£, c] with c � a. Industry 
information, such as the demand schedule, the form of the cost function, and 
the distribution F, is common-knowledge. 
In deriving the set of enforceable cartels, we consider the direct 
revelation game in which firms simultaneously report their variable costs 
. . .  , c } , resulting in an allocation q(c) = (q1 (c) ,  . . .  , q (c) }n - n 
and r(c) = (r1 (c) , . . .  , rn (c) }, where qi � 0 is the output of firm i and ri
is firm i's share of the industry revenues for producing qi . 5  The pair of 
outcome rules (q,r), which determine an allocation as a function of the 
firms' reports, is called a cartel. A feasible cartel satisfies the ex post 
budget balance constraint that the sum of the revenue shares equals the total 
industry revenue: 
(B) I r1 (c) = p(c) = [ a i=l l I qi < c)i=l for all c E [c, c]n.
A firm seeks to maximize expected profit. Ex post a firm with cost ci, 
producing the quantity qi , and receiving the revenue ri has a profit of 
4None of the characterization results in this section depend on our
assumption of a linear demand curve or the assumption of linear costs. What 
is important is that the private information enter linearly in the form 
Ci (qi) = ciH(q1) ,  where H(·) is some continuous increasing function. Both 
assumptions, however, do play important roles in later sections. 
50ur analysis of the direct revelation game draws heavily upon the prior 
work of Baron and Myerson ( 1982], Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer [1987], and 
Myerson and Satterthwaite ( 198 3]. 
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ri - ciqi . Let -i = N\i and let E_i (·) be the expectation operator with
respect to c_i . Then we can define the expected production and revenue for 
firm i when it announces ci by 
and 
so the firm's expected profit is 
Incentive Compatibility 
A cartel (q,r) is incentive compatible if all types of all firms want to 
report their private information truthfully: 
for all i EN, and ci ,v E [£,c]. 
By the revelation principle , we lose no generality by restricting attention 
to incentive compatible cartels. 
The assumptions of independence and risk neutrality allow us to give a 
convenient representation of incentive compatibility. In particular, for any 
incentive compatible cartel, there is a precise relationship between the 
expected revenue Ri and the expected production Qi : once q is specified both 
�i and Ri are determined up to a constant. 
Lemma 1. The cartel ( q, r) is incentive compatible if and only if for every
i EN, Qi is decreasing and for all c', c1 E [c,c] 
(IC) vdQ1 (v) .
Moreover, if ( q, r) is incentive compatible, then rr1 is convex and decreasing
with derivative drri/dci - -Qi almost everywhere and for all c' , ci E [£,c] 
Proof: Only if. If (q,r) is incentive compatible, then 
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or equivalently 
implying that rr1 has a supporting hyperplane at v with slope -Qi (v) � 0 .  
Thus , rri is convex and has derivative drri/dci = -Q1 almost everywhere. Also, 
Qi must be decreasing, and 
-
J 
c' 
Qi(v) dv.
Ci 
(We use the Stieltjes integral throughout this paper, so that any 
discontinuities in the expected production function Qi are accounted for in 
the integral. ) By integration by parts, 
J
c' 
Qi (v) dv = c'Qi (c') -
Ci 
which together with the definition of rri yields (IC).
If. Subtracting the identity 
from (IC) results in 
vdQ1 (v) , 
where the inequality follows because the integrand is nonpositive for all ci 
and v E [ci ,c], since Qi is decreasing. Rearranging the terms on the
lefthand side yields 
which is incentive compatibility. • 
Individual Rationality 
In order to define the set of enforceable cartels, it is necessary to 
specify exactly what happens if one firm refuse.s to join (or defects from) 
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the cartel. We assume that a single defection from the proposed cartel by 
one of the firms leads to a complete break-down of the cartel and so the 
industry produces as an n-firm Cournot oligopoly with output determined by 
either Cournot or Bertrand competition. Let �a(c) be the expected payoff to 
a firm with cost c if the cartel is not formed, where a = C or B depending on
whether Cournot or Bertrand competition occurs when one or more firms refuse 
to participate in the cartel. Similarly, define Qa(c) and Ra(c) to be the 
expected quantity and revenue of firm c if the cartel breaks down. The 
functions �a, Qa, and Ra are determined in the next section for both Cournot 
and Bertrand competition. These functions do not depend on i due to the 
symmetry of the model. 
The cartel (q,r) is said to be individually rational with respect to the 
threat a if all firms are better-off joining the cartel than defecting:
for all i E N and ci E [c,c]. 
A feasible cartel that is incentive compatible and individually rational is 
called an enforceable cartel, since the allocation implied by an enforceable 
cartel is the outcome of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 2. An incentive-compatible cartel ( q, r) is individually rational if
(IR) 
Proof: .It is necessary and sufficient to check individual rationality at 
individual rationality is satisfied for the worst-off types of firms it is 
satisfied for all types. The continuity of both �i and �a implies that
U�(c1) has a minimum over c1 E [£,c]. Taking the derivative of U� with 
respect to c1 and applying Lemma 1 yields the first-order necessary condition 
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for an interior minimum:6
/\ 
(C) 
The worst-off type must either be at an extreme point (£ or c) or at an
interior point satisfying (C). • 
Lemma 2 states that the individual-rationality constraint is binding at
/\ an extreme point (c or C) or at an interior point Ci SUCh that the firm's
expected production under the cartel agreement is equal to the production 
without the cartel. Notice that a firm's net payoff U�(·) = �i ( · ) - �a( · ) is
increasing whenever expected production with the cartel is less than 
production without the cartel. 
We now provide a general characterization of enforceable cartels. 
Theore m  1. For any production rule q � 0,  there exists a revenue rule r such
that the cartel (q, r) is enforceable if and only if Qi(·) is decreasing and 
for all 8i E Ci 
n 
(E) l 
i=l 
where 
(R) 
[ R,(C) - Cq,(C) + 
n n 
l: R1 (c) = E[p(c) J + l: 
i=l i=l
n 
l 
i=l
J c
c 
vF(v) dQi (v) . 
Proof: Only if. Suppose (q,r) is incentive compatible and individually
rational. Then from Lemma 1, for any c' and c1
vdQ1 (v) . 
Integrating over all types in [£,c] yields
6To simplify notation, we assume that both Qi and Qa are continuous.
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R,(c1) - I�'-£ I :�c'
vdQ1(v)dF(c
')
R1(c1) +I :-c, 
I :._v
dF(c')vdQ1(v) - I:�£ I :._c
dF(c')vdQ1(v)
J -
c
c
i 
F(v)vdQi (v).
where the second line follows from changing the order of integration. Budget 
balance requires that 
n 
l ri (c) 
i=l 
p(c) for all c E [
£
,C]n,
so we have 
I Ei {ri (c')) = E { I ri (c) } = E(p(c)].
i=l i=l 
Therefore, summing over all firms yields 
n 
(T) l Ri(ci) 
i=l 
E(p(c)] + .I [ J ciF(v)vdQi (v)
1.=l c 
J :
;
l - F(v)]vdQ1(v)].
Evaluating (T) at ci = c results in (R). Integrating (IC) by parts and 
letting c'= c and ci 
/\ 
ci yields 
CT) 
/\ /\ /\ Q 
/\ 
From Lemma 2, Ri (Ci ) - ciQi (ci) 2:: 1T (ci), 
n 
I /\ ,., ,., [Ri (ci) - Ci Qi (Ci)) 2:: 
i=l 
,., 
Substituting (T) into the expression above 
If. The proof is by construction. Let 
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which implies 
n 
I Q /\ 1T (ci). 
i=l 
yields (E). 
where 
1
n 
1 
vdQi (v) - n - 1 
[ p(c) - E_1 [p(c)] + 1 n - 1 
vdQj (v) ,
1 Then I pi ( c) = p ( c) and E_ i [pi ( c)] E [p(c)]. n After changing the order 
of integration, 
1 L 
J _
-
c
c 
jr"i 
[ 1 - F(v) ]vdQj (v), n - 1 
so Lemma 1 guarantees that (q,r) is incentive compatible. Finally, we have 
A A A A 
individual rationality if and only if Ri (ci) - ciQi(c1) � rra(ci) by Lemma 2.
Budget balance requires I r1(c) = p(c), which implies I ti = 0 .  Our 
hypothesis is that (E) is satisfied, which is equivalent to 
n 
I n 
i=l
1 
J 
�i 
£ vdQ1 (v) + 
1 
n - 1 I 
jr"i J 
: [l - F(v)]vdQ,(v),
Theorem 1 can be stated much more simply if the cartel production is 
symmetric. A production rule q is symmetric if Qi(·) - Qj (·) = Q(·) for all 
i,j E N. Due to the symmetry of our model, nothing is gained by looking at 
asymmetric production rules. 
Corollary 1. For any symmetric production rule q � 0 ,  there exists a revenue
rule r such that the cartel ( q, r) is enforceable if and only if Q( ') is
I\ 
decreasing and for all c E (£, C} u (v I Q(v) 
(E') R(C) - CQ(C) + J :  Q(v) dv � ,a(�),
where 
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(RI) R(c) � E[p(c)] + I: vF(v) dQ(v) .
Proof: Given that Qi(·) = Qj ( · ) = Q(·) for all i,j EN, it immediately 
follows that (E') and (R') are equivalent to (E) and (R) of Theorem 1. • 
3. Cournot and Bertrand Competition 
In this section, we determine the industry outcome if a cartel does not 
form. Two alternative outcomes are considered: Cournot competition 
(Lemma 3) and Bertrand competition (Lemma 4). Figure 1 illustrates the 
profit functions under both the Cournot (�c) and monopoly (�M) outcomes, as 
well as the net payoff Uc = �M - �c , for the case with four firms and uniform 
uncertainty (F(v) = v). 
Lemma 3. Firm i's quantity Qc, profit �c, and revenue Rc under Cournot
competition are given by 
(QC) {
0 
1 - - ci)-(c 2 
if Ci � c 
if Ci < c 
{
0 
1 -
- Ci )
2-(c 4 
(�C) 
if Ci � c
if Ci < c
if c. l. � c 
(RC) 
if Ci < c 
where c - c if 2(a - c) � (n l) [c  - Ei (ci)] and otherwise c is defined
implicitly (and uniquely) by the equation 
(C) 2(a - c) (n - 1) I c F(v) dv. 
.£ 
Proof: In the Cournot game, firm i seeks to maximize its expected profit 
given the output decisions of the other firms. Firm i's profit �c(ci) is 
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given by 
c�c') 
where c = a - (n - l)Q and Q is the expected value of Qi . Taking the
derivative of the profit function with respect to Qi yields the first-order 
condition 
Checking the boundary conditions we see that firm i's output is given by 
{
0 if c. � c 
= Qc(ci)
1 
Qi 1 --(c - ci) if Ci < c .2 
Substituting Qi into c�c') yields c�c). Moreover, 
Q 1 
I
c 1 
I
c 
2 
c 
(c - v) dF(v) = z F(v)dv. 
£ 
Substituting Q into the definition of c yields the implicit condition (C) for
c ,  which determines a unique c since the lefthand side of (C) is strictly
decreasing, the righthand side is strictly increasing, and the lefthand side 
is greater (less) than the righthand side at c = c (c). The formula for (RC )
follows from a simple calculation. • 
With Bertrand competition, since output is homogeneous , only the lowest 
cost firm will produce, since it will be able to undercut all other firms. 
We imagine the pricing game working in approximately the following way. Each 
firm posts a price. After seeing all other firms' prices, each firm can post 
a (lower) price if it wishes. The procedure stops when no firm lowers its 
price. The lowest-priced firm satisfies demand at its final posted price. 
This game is strategically similar to an English auction . Each firm will 
initially post its monopoly price, (a + c1) /2, and from then on meet the 
lowest competing price until that price falls below ci . Figure 2 shows a 
firm's expected profit under the Bertrand and monopoly outcomes for an 
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example with four firms and uniform uncertainty . Notice that a firm's net 
payoff uB is increasing in its cost , so that individual rationality needs to
be checked only for a firm with cost c .  
Lemma 4. Firm i's quantity QB, profit �B, and revenue RB under B ertrand
competition are given by 
(QB ) 
(�B ) 
(RB) 
where G(v) 
= 
[1 - F(v)]n-l.
Proof: Let ci be the lowest cost among the n firms and let cs be the second-
lowest cost. Under Bertrand competition price falls to the second lowest 
cost , cs,
1 or the monopoly price of the lowest-cost firm, 2<a + ci) ,  whichever
is less. Thus, firm i's ex post production is 
0 if Ci > ci
q� (c) { if and 1 ci)a - cs Ci ci c !> -(a + s 2 1 1 -(a - ci) if Ci ci and c > -(a + ci)2 s 2 
Firm i has the lowest cost if the cost of each of the other n - 1 firms is 
greater than ci , so
Pr{ min cj > Ci } 
- ( 1  - F(ci)]n-1 ... G(ci).il""j 
The interim production for firm i is then found by integrating over the 
possible costs of the second-lowest cost firm: 
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1 
J
2<a+ci)
= - (a - v)dG(v) 
Ci 
Performing the integration (by parts) results in 
1 1
1
2 (a - c i ) dG ( v)  .
2<a+ci)
J
2<a+ci)
+ vG(v) - G(v) dv + 
Ci Ci 
which after simplifying yields (QB) . Similar calculations lead to the 
equations (rrB) and (RB) . • 
4. Ex Post E fficiency 
A cartel (q,r) is ex post efficient if for each vector of costs c the
outcome of the agreement { q(c) ,r(c) } is Pareto-undominated by any alternative 
allocation, ignoring incentive constraints. Thus, ex post efficiency 
requires that the lowest-cost firm produces the monopoly output and the other 
firms produce nothing. In this section, we answer the question of whether 
this monopoly outcome can be attained by an enforceable cartel. We begin by 
determining the monopoly outcome. 
Lemma 5. Firm i's quantity QM, profit rrM, and revenue Jt1 in the monopoly
outcome ignoring side-payments are given by 
(Q/1) � (ci) 1 ci ) G(ci)- -(a -2 
( rr/1) rrM(ci) 1 Ci ) ZG(ci)"" -(a -4 
(RM) Jtl(ci) 1 2 - ciz ) G(ci)- -(a 4 
where G (v) - [l - F(v)]n-l, 
Proof: The monopoly output for the lowest-cost firm ci "" min ci is given by
1qi(ci) - argmax { (a - q - c�) q} - 2<a - c�) .
q 
Hence, the ex post efficient production function is 
15 
1 { 2<a - c,e)
q� (c) = 
0 
and by independence, the expected production is 
M 1 1 1Q (c1) = 2<a - c1)[1 - F(c1 ) ]n- = 2(a - ci) G(ci) .
The equations (�M) and (RM) follow immediately. • 
We now show that the individual rationality constraint is not binding at 
c, so that individual rationality need only be checked at £ and; defined by 
(C). Let RM(·) be the expected revenue after side-payments from the monopoly
outcome. 
Lemma 6. In an ex post efficient cartel, the expected revenue of the 
highest-cost firm is given by 
(R) 1£1 (c) = 
c 1 J-c 4(a - v)2(n - l)f(v)F(v)[l - F(v)]n-2dv > O.
Proof: From Corollary 1, 
R"(C) - � E[p(c) )  + J: vF(v)dQ"(v) .  
Observe that 
1 1 J c 1 n E (p(c) ] = n £ 4(a - v) (a + v) nf(v) [l - F(v) ]n-ldv,
and 
J: vF(v) dQ"(v) - vF(v) Q"(v) c c J :[F(v) + vf(v)]Q"(v) dv
- 0 - J :[F(v) + vf(v) J!<• - v )[l - F(v) j•'1dv .
Therefore, 
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I
: [ t<• - v)(a + v)f(v) - [F(v) + vf(v)]�(a - v) ]11 - F(v)]"-1dv,
and so 
(R" ) 
Next, integrating the second term by parts yields 
I£
c 
�(a - v)F(v)[l - F(v)]n-ldv - t<a - v)2F(v)(l - F(v)]n-l 
c
+ 
I
:%<• - v)2 [ f(v)[l - F(v)]n-l - f(v)F(v)(n - 1)[1 - F(v)J"-2 ] dv 
I 
c 
1 £ 4(a - v)2f(v)F(v)(n-1)[1-F(v)]n-2dv.
Substituting this back into (R" ) ,  we get (R). • 
Equation (R) has a nice interpretation. It says that the revenue, and
hence the expected profit, to the highest-cost firm equals l/n times the 
expected industry profit if the second most profitable firm were to produce
its monopoly output (since n(n - l)f(v)F(v)[l - F(v)]n-2 is the density of 
the second-order statistic). This suggests why it is difficult to enforce 
the monopoly outcome: the highest-cost firm must be paid a substantial 
amount of money to report its type truthfully, even if it would not produce
without the cartel. As the number of firms grows, the amount paid to the 
highest-cost firm converges to an equal share of the industry profits when 
the lowest-cost firm produces the monopoly output. 
The next two theorems give a necessary and sufficient condition for the
attainment of the monopoly outcome by an enforceable cartel with either a 
Cournot or Bertrand threat. Simply put, the necessary and sufficient 
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condition is that individual rationality must be satisfied for the worst-off 
type . With Cournot competition , this worst-off type must occur at an 
A A 
interior point c such that firm e's production is the same with or without 
the cartel. With Bertrand competition , the worst-off type is £ ,  since the 
monopoly output is less than the Bertrand output for all types of firms , and 
hence a firm's net profit uc(·) is increasing. 
Theorem 2. Under a threat of Cournot competition, the monopoly outcome can 
A 
be attained by an enforceable cartel if and only if for all c such that 
QM(�) = Qc(�) we have
(MC) 
Proof: With the monopoly outcome and a Cournot threat, (MC) is equivalent to 
(E' ) ,  since QM(c) - 0 .  Hence, Theorem 2 is equivalent to Corollary 1, except
A that individual rationality is only checked at the interior point c .  It 
suffices to show that the worst-off type of firm cannot be at either extreme 
point c or c .  Lemma 6 proves that firm c is not the worst-off type. Since 
£) , QM(£) > Qc(£) so the firm's net payoff
Uc(·) is decreasing at £· Thus, c is not the worst-off type. • 
Theorem 3. Under a threat of Bertrand competition, the monopoly outcome can 
be attained by an enforceable cartel if and only if 
(MB) R" (C) + J : Q" (v)dv « .. (.<;).
Proof: With the monopoly outcome and a Bertrand threat, (MB) is equivalent 
to (E') evaluated at c .  Hence, it suffices to show that the worst-off type 
of firm is c. A firm's net payoff U8(·) is increasing if and only if
18 
or equivalently, 
(a - c. ) G(c. ) -l. l. 
1
I 
2(a+ci) G(v) 
G(c. ) dv.c. l. l. 
But this inequality is always satisfied, since G(v) /G(c1) s 1 for all v � c1.
Therefore, uB (·) is everywhere increasing, so the worst-off type must be c. • 
In determining what happens when the number of firms increases, it 
perhaps makes more sense to expand demand as n grows, so that if the number 
of firms doubles then industry demand doubles as well. In this case, the 
inverse demand is given by P(q) - a - It is easy to show that the 
effect of expanding demand as n increases is to increase profit, revenue, and 
production by a factor of n, due to the linearity of costs. Moreover, the 
/\ -values c and c are the same as when demand is held constant. Thus, the set 
of enforceable cartels remains the same whether demand is held constant or 
expanded as n increases. That ex post efficiency is unattainable as n grows 
is a consequence of the heightened competition among firms, rather than 
dividing a pie of constant size into smaller pieces . 
It has proven difficult to show in general that ex post efficiency is 
not obtainable with sufficiently many firms. In order to derive the result 
/\ 
for Cournot competition we need to show that c converges to £ much faster
than c. This is difficult, since there is no explicit solution for c and � 
in general .  We can, however, demonstrate the result for both Cournot and 
Bertrand competition when costs are uniformly distributed. In addition, the 
next theorem provides a general result for the Bertrand threat, assuming the 
distribution F satisfies the condition below.
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(F) There exists c* > c such that for all v E [£,c*], F(v) < 2(v-£)/(a-£) .
Theorem 4. If (F) is satisfied, then for sufficiently large n, the monopoly 
outcome is not enforceable by the Bertrand threat. 
Proof: From Lemma 6 ,  
and 
so 
c 1 J-c 4(a - v)2(n - l) f(v) F(v) [l - F(v) ]n-2dv
1 a - c 2 c 1 1 _ J-n ( -2 ) - c 2 (a-v) [ n [l - F(v) ]n + F(v) [l - F(v)]n 1 J dv,
c c 1 J- J-£ Q(v) dv = £ 2 (a - v )[l - F(v) ]n-1dv,
J-
c 1 RM(c) + 
£ 
Q(v) dv = n [ • : £ ] 2 + n � l J: [ • ; v ] 
[ • : £ r n � 1 J : [ • ; v ] 2 
where �(v) = nf(v)[l - F(v) ]n-l. In addition, 
� (v) dv, 
�· (£) - J � a+c) ��+£-2V) Gn-1 (v) dv - [ •:
£r- J : •+£) 12 [ ·:v - v:c ] 2g,, 
_ 1 (v) dv 
Therefore, from Theorem 3 ,  the monopoly outcome is not enforceable with the 
Bertrand threat if and only if 
1 j c ( ) 2 J (a+c) /2 [ a - v  v - c i 2n � £ a ; v �(v) dv > £ - -2- - -2- � �-l(v)dv,
or equivalently 
J c ( ) 2 J (a+c) /2 [ a - v v - c l 2 
c 
a ; v [l - F(v) ]�_1(v) dv> £ -
2
- -
2
- �-1(v) dv,
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which holds if 
F(v)]g,,_1(v)dv >I �a+c)/2 [ a:v - v:� ] 2g,,_1(v)dv.
Since a - v > v - c > 0 for v E (£,1] where 1 (a+£)/2, the last inequality 
holds if and only if 
I
1 [ ) 2 11 [ ) 2 11 [v-cl [2a+c-3vl 
£ 
a
;v (l-F(v)]�_1(v)dv > 
£ 
a
;v �-1(v)dv -
£ 2
- � �_1(v)dv,
or equivalently 
I: [
a
; 
v 
J
2F(v)g,,_1(v)dv < 1: [ v: £ ] [ 2a + :- Jv ] g,,_1(v)dv,
which holds for large n if for v sufficiently close to £, 
(D) [ a ; v ) 2F(v) 
To see this, let 
D(v) = ( 
a 
; v ) 
2F(v) 
The condition (D) amounts to saying that there exists c" > c such that for 
all v E (£,c"], D(v) < 0 .  Denote e •min ( */2 *] ID(v)j and let VE C ,c 
M =max 
( 
* )
ID(v)j. Then VE c ,1 1 1
D(v)�_1 (v)dv - 1 c*/�(v)�_1(v)dv + 1 c� D(v)�_1 (v)dv + I 1p(v)�_1 (v)dv
£ £ c /2 c 1 c*/2 
< 
£ 
D(v)�_1(v)dv -
= J 
_
c
c
* /2 
D(v)�_ 1 (v)dv
- ((1-F(c"/2)]n-l - (l-F(c*)]n-
1
J [e - M 1 ][(1-F(c"/2))(1-F(c"))]n-l - 1 
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< 0 for large n, since F(c"/2)  < F(c") implies 
1 
lim 
n->co [(l-F(c"/2) ) (1-F(c") ) ]n-l
Since F is continuous, a sufficient condition for 
5. An Example with Uniform Costs
- 1 
(D) 
that 
0. 
to hold is (F) .• 
_Suppose that a = 1 and the firms' costs are uniformly distributed on
[0,1]. Then (C) can be written as
2(1 - C) - (n - 1)  J : vdv,
which implies that c = 2/(./ri + 1 ) . In addition, for an ex post efficient
cartel, QM(v) 1 A = 2(1 - v )n, so that c is found by finding the first positive
root of the equation 
A - A 
(1 - c)n  - c - c. 
The interim production with Bertrand competition is found by 
substituting a = 1 and F(v) = v into (QB ) to yield
1 
I 2
<l+ci )
( 1 - c i ) n - ( 1 - v) n - 1 dv Ci 
Table 1 summarizes other formulas for the monopoly, Cournot, and 
Bertrand outcomes. For example, the ex ante industry profit with the Cournot 
outcome is given by 
11'c (v) dF(v) J c 1 - 2 = n -(c - v )  dv
0 4 
and the industry profit with the monopoly outcome is 
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= nc3/12,
n I: •"(v) dF(v) - I� �(l - v) n+ldv n 4(n + 2) 
The expected revenue to the highest-cost firm is found by integrating 
(R) by parts: 
(R') RM (1)
J
1 1 - l)v(l - v) n dv-(n 
0 4 
1 [ v(l - v) n+l 1 
J
1 (1 _ v)n+ 1 dv ]= -(n - 1) n + 1 + n + 1 4 0 0 
(1 - v) n+Z ken - 1) [ - (n + l)(n + 2) 1 l n - 1 0 = 4(n + l) (n + 2) . 
In addition, 
(QM') J C J
1 l (l _ �)n+l 
; 
QM(v)dv = ; 2(1 - v) ndv - 2(n + l)
By substituting these values into (MC) , we get that the monopoly outcome is 
attainable by an enforceable cartel with a Cournot threat if and only if 
(MC') n - 1 4(n + l)(n + 2) + 
(1 - 8) n+l
2(n + 1) 
where � = 2/(/n + 1) and 8 is the first positive root of (1 - 8) n  = c - �.
Similarly, substituting (R') and (QM') into (MB) yields
or equivalently 
(MB') 
n - 1 
4(n + l)(n + 2)  
n - 1 
2(n + 1) 
1 + 2(n + 1) ;:::; _§__ n + 1 
It is easy to check that (MB') is violated for all n 2:: 2; thus, with a 
Bertrand threat, the monopoly outcome is never attainable. 
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Table 1. Formulas with a = 1 and F(v) = v (ignoring side-payments) 
Outcome 
Quantity 
Profit 
Revenue 
Outcome 
Quantity 
Profit 
Revenue 
n 
" c-c
Outcome 
Monopoly 
Cournot 
Bertrand 
Outcome 
Monopoly 
Cournot 
Bertrand 
Outcome 
Monopoly 
Cournot 
Bertrand 
n( 'lt'M-'lt'C Jn('ll'M-'lt'B J
Firm Interim Calculations 
Monopoly Cournot Bertrand 
�(l - ci) n 1 - {3(1 - c. ) n2<c - ci) 1 
�(l - ci ) n+l 1 - 24(c - ci) f3 _ c.) n+ln + l(l 1 
1:(1 + c1 ) (1 - ci) n 1 -2 -(c 4 4 c. 
2) - 1 _f3_ 1 (nc. n + i + 1)(1 
- ci) n
Industry Ex Ante Calculations 
Monopoly Cournot Bertrand 
n n -2 _Ef}_ 
2(n + 1) 4 c n + 1 
n n - n@_ 
4(n + 2) 12 C3 (n + 1) (n + 2) 
n(n + 3) n -3 2n@_ 
4(n + l)(n + 2) 6 c (n + l) (n + 2) 
c - 2/(./n + 1) 
Table 2. Numerical Calculations with a =  1 and F(v) = v 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
. 2200 . 1793 . 1537 . 1357 . 1221 . 1115 . 1029 
. 8284 . 7321 . 6667 . 6180 . 5798 .5486 . 5224 
Ex Ante Industry Quantity 
. 3333 .3750 .4000 . 4167 . 4286 . 4375 . 4444 
. 3431 .4019 . 4444 . 4775 . 5042 . 5267 . 5458 
. 4167 .5313 . 6125 . 6719 . 7165 . 7510 . 7782 
Ex Ante Industry Profit 
. 1250 . 1500 . 1667 . 1786 . 1875 . 1944 . 2000 
. 0948 . 0981 . 0988 . 0984 . 0975 . 0963 .0950 
.1042 .1063 . 1021 . 0960 . 0896 . 0834 . 0778 
Ex Ante Industry Revenue 
. 2083 .2250 .2333 . 2381 . 2411 . 2431 . 2444 
. 1895 . 1962 . 1975 . 1967 . 1949 . 1926 . 1901 
. 2083 . 2125 . 2042 . 1920 . 1791 . 1669 . 1556 
Individual Rationality of Worst-Off Type 
. 0148 .0160 .0105 . 0019 -. 0081 -. 0186 -. 0292 
-. 0417 -. 0813 -. 1125 -. 1362 -. 1540 -. 1676 -. 1782 
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a) 
0 
0 
. 5
1 
1 
.25 
0 
0 
. 25 
0 
0 
-. 75 
-. 25 
Table 2 presents numerical calculations for several n. The last two 
rows in the table present the individual-rationality constraint for the 
worst-off type of firm with Cournot and Bertrand competition, respectively. 
The monopoly outcome is attainable by an enforceable cartel if and only if 
the difference between the expected profit with the ex post efficient cartel 
and the expected profit without the cartel is nonnegative. Thus, with a 
Bertrand threat, the monopoly outcome is never enforceable; whereas, with a 
Cournot threat, the monopoly outcome is enforceable if and only if n � 5. 
The fact that enforcing the monopoly outcome with few firms is more 
difficult with a Bertrand threat than a Cournot threat follows from the fact 
that Bertrand competition is less competitive than Cournot competition when 
there are few firms with uncertainty about costs . 
6 .  Enforceable Cartels with Common Value Uncertainty 
Sections 2-5 presented results for a private value model in which firm 
types (costs) are independent . This section presents a related analysis for 
the case in which firms have a common (but uncertain) cost, c, and each 
receives a signal, s1, about the cost . While the basic approach is quite
similar, the problem facing the cartel is much different, and much easier in 
at least one important respect . In particular, to achieve the joint monopoly 
outcome it is no longer necessary for the cartel to identify the most 
efficient firm, since all firms are equally efficient . The only uncertainty 
is how much to produce in aggregate, so the cartel has an extra degree of 
freedom: how to share production . Since total industry profits are 
independent of the individual allocation of production levels, it may be 
possible to generate effective side payments simply by altering the assigned 
productio� allocations . 
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As before, we may think of a cartel as a pair of functions (t(·),q(·) ) 
that maps each vector of firm types into a vector of revenue shares and 
output assignments, respectively. It is feasible if the revenue shares never 
exceed the total cartel revenues. However, because of the information 
structure, a firm's expected profit is not quite so easy to represent. 
Denote: 
Then, if the "true" cost equals c, and a firm receives signal si , we have 
(IC) 
Expecting over c, after conditioning on si gives 
(IC I ) 
where U.I. (si ) - Ec (Ui (c, s1) I si ) and Ti (si ) = Ec (Ti (c, si ) I si ). At this
point we encounter some difficulty since (IC') apparently does not produce a 
single "envelope" characterization of incentive compatibility, like the one 
obtained for the private values model in Lemma 1. A sufficient (but not 
necessary) condition for incentive compatibility can be obtained as in 
Lemma 1 by applying the usual techniques to (IC) , for each realization of c, 
but this is not particularly useful. 
Thus the revelation principle approach appears to have limited 
usefulness in this context, at least for the purpose of characterizing 
mechanisms.7 Fortunately, this problem contains sufficient structure so that 
we can still establish several results relating to the question of enforcing 
the joint monopoly solution, without deriving a condition like (E) . In 
particular, we provide a set of assumptions about the threat game which is 
7A similar problem is encountered in pure exchange settings (e. g. 
auctions) with common value uncertainty. 
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sufficient to guarantee the ability of large cartels to successfully attain 
the monopoly solution. This contrasts sharply with the results for private 
costs. 
To establish this result, we examine a simple cartel rule which is 
incentive compatible. We then specify conditions on the threat game such 
that the cartel rule will also be individually rational. The mechanism is 
the simplest imaginable one, which we call equal-share information pooling. 
Each firm is asked to report si . This determines an optimal (monopoly) 
aggregate cartel production level �M(s1, . . •  ,sn) .  Each firm is then required
to produce an equal share of this amount, and retains the revenues from 
selling the output it produces. Notice that this mechanism does not involve 
side-payments. We claim that for a wide variety of threat games, this cartel 
rule works for sufficiently large cartels, We present an example which 
demonstrates that it can fail for small cartels, and explain how the 
mechanism may need to be embellished when there are few firms. 
The information structure is the following. The constant average cost 
of production c is the same for all firms, but is unknown at the time 
production takes place. Let C - [c,c] be the set of possible costs. Given 
c E C, each firm observes a signal si which is an independent draw from a 
common distribution, conditional on c, denoted F(si le) . We assume that 
signals take on values in the unit interval and, for all c E C, F(Olc) = 0 ,
F(llc) = 1 and F is continuous and strictly increasing on (0 ,1]. To complete 
the notation, let H(c) be the marginal distribution on C and G(clsi ) be the 
conditional distribution of c, given an observation si E (0 ,1].
Rather than specifying the exact structure of a threat game, a, we 
represent the threat game by the output functions induced by symmetric 
Bayesian equilibrium behavior of the firms under the incentives generated by 
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the threat game. 
Let qn: [O,l]n � R�. We say that qn is an n-firm threat if there exists
a threat game a with a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium which induces an output 
function qn(·) .  Since we are interested in enforcing cartels with many 
firms, we will have to consider sequences q = {qn):=z with the property for
each n, qn is an n-firm threat. We call q a threat. 
We say that equal share information pooling is enforceable relative to 
threat q if for sufficiently large n it is incentive compatible and 
individually rational relative to qn for all s1. Since it is trivially 
incentive compatible for all n, we need only prove that it is individually 
rational for all types when n is sufficiently large. Fixing q, use the 
following notation 
n 
;�(s,c) - (a - c - l qj(s) ]q�(s) for all s E [O,l]n, c E C
j-1 
1l"n (t) I :J >J 
1 
;� ( S , C ) dF ( S 1 I C ) • • • dF ( Si _ 1 I C ) dF ( Si + 1 I C ) . • • dF ( Sn I C ) dG ( C I t)0 
�M(t) � J: [max[0,(a-c) /2l]2dG(cit) for all t e [O,l] 
Mn(e,t) = {s E [0,1) I 1fn(s) ;:::; e1fn(t) ) for all e > 0, t e[O,l]
:;;:n = n J c
c 
J
O
l 
" 1fn(t) dF(tjc) dH(c) .
Thus, ;�(·, · ) is the ex post profit to firm i under qn as a function of the
true cost and any vector of signals; 1fn(·) is the interim expected profit to 
a firm under qn as a function of that firm's signal; Mn(e,t) is the set of 
firm types whose interim profits exceed e times the interim profit of a type 
t firm; ;n is the ex ante aggregate expected profits of the group of firms 
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under qn; 11'M(t) is a bit more difficult to interpret, but it is the interim
expected profits of a monopolist who has observed signal t E [ 0 ,1], but who 
is permitted to produce after observing cost. For large n, this will 
approximate n times the interim cartel profits of a type t firm under the 
equal share information pooling mechanism. 
We say that a threat q is uniformly competitive if 
(ql) lim ;rn 0
n-+co 
and for all t E ( 0 ,1] there exists €,1 > 0 such that for all c and n 
(q2) I dF(s1 le) > 1 · Mn ( €, t) 
The first part of this definition requires that aggregate ex ante profits. 
under q converge to 0.  The second part of the definition requires that if 
some firm is earning positive profits under qn then a nontrivial set of other 
firms is also earning positive profits. Furthermore, as n gets large, this 
set of other firms grows at a rate on the order n. 
Theorem 5. If q is uniformly competitive, then equal-share information 
pooling is an enforceable cartel. 
Proof: We need to show that for large n, the cartel is individually rational 
relative to a for all types t E ( 0 ,1]. First, note that 11'M(t) = 0 implies 
that qn(t) - 0 for all t, so the cartel is individually rational for these 
firms. Therefore, suppose that 11'M(t) > 0. With information pooling, the
interim joint monopoly profits, conditional on s, converge to 11'M(t) .
Therefore, individual rationality will be satisfied for t if, for 
sufficiently large n, 
lim n11'n(t) < 11'M(t)
n-+co 
We next show that the left hand side of this inequality converges 
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to 0 if q is uniformly competitive. From definitions, 
J c J 1 ;rn = n �n(s) dF(sjc) dH(c) c 0 
c 
� n J J �n(s) dF(sjc) dH(c) c Mn(e,t) 
� n J: ' •" ( t) J dF(sjc) Mn ( e, t)  
Hence, n�n(t) < ;rn;e� for all n. Therefore, by, (ql) 
lim n�n(t) = 0. • 
n-+co 
dH(c) 
We illustrate the above result with the following example. Let a be. the 
interim Cournot quantity game. Let there be two possible signals and two 
possible costs. Let a - 1, C = {0,3} with h(O) - 1/2, h(3) = 1/2, SE [0,1], 
and 
- 0 )  - { 0 if Si < 1/2 f(s11c - 3 )  - {
2 
52 if Si < 1/2
f(si jc 
- 52 2 - 0 if Si � 1/2 if Si � 1/2.
Therefore for small o, low signals are rare, quite optimistic, and highly 
informative, whereas high signals are common, mildly pessimistic, and 
uninformative. 
With two firms it can be shown that for small o, the following is an 
equilibrium: 
(l+S) a - 36 
2(1+6) + 6(1-6) /2 
0 
if Si < 1/2 
if Si � 1/2. 
Since completely uninformed firms would produce 0, a low-signal firm is able 
to act as a monopolist in the low-cost state and produces a/2. Its expected 
30 
profit is approximately a2/4. It is not individually rational for a low 
signal type to participate in the equal share information pooling cartel, 
since such a firm would have to part with (almost) half of its (almost) 
monopoly profit. 
With n firms, the unique equilibrium is 
! (l+S) a - 35 
2(1+5) + (n:l) 5(1+52)/2 if Si < 1/2 
if Si � 1/2. 
Expected profit equals (qn) z which converges to 0 on the order of n2, so
n�n(t) � 0 for all t. Expected cartel profits for a low-signal firm 
converges to (a2/4) /(l+o) > 0 .  Expected cartel profits for a high-signal 
form converges to (a2/4) (2-S) /(4-S-S2) >0 . 
It is interesting to note that, while the equal sharing rule does not 
work for small n, a rule in which one's share is an explicit function of the 
vector of reported signals is individually rational and incentive compatible, 
at least for small n. Under this rule, firms who submit a low signal are 
asked to produce a large proportion of the output. In particular, the share 
equals 0 if a firm submits a high signal and l/k otherwise, where k is the 
number of firms submitting a low signal. This suggests that the ability for 
a cartel to enforce the joint monopoly solution with only common value 
uncertainty is even more general than we have established here, where we have 
been limited to mechanisms in which shares are independent of reports. 
7. Discussion
We have presented a simple model of cartel enforcement in an effort to
determine how uncertainty about costs limits the power of a cartel to enforce 
desirable outcomes. Several strong assumptions have been made in order to 
keep the analysis manageable. In this section, we discuss the effects of 
alternative assumptions. 
No Side-Payments. If side-payments are not allowed, then the revenue rule 
must equal the actual revenue for each firm: ri (c) = [a 
With this restriction, the set of enforceable cartels is greatly diminished. 
Indeed, it is easy to show that with private cost uncertainty the monopoly 
outcome is not attainable, since every firm has an incentive to understate 
its cost, so as to increase its expected production. With common cost 
uncertainty, the equal-share information pooling rule still applies. 
Durability. Suppose that each firm votes for or against the proposed cartel 
(q,r) . If the cartel is not approved unanimously, then the competitive
outcome as specified by the threat a results. In deriving the threat a, we 
have assumed that nothing is learned from the voting process. Alternatively, 
we may want to allow some inference in the face of disagreement. 8 In
particular, it seems plausible that if a firm votes against the cartel, it 
did so because it gains the least from the proposed rules. We have shown 
that a low-cost firm benefits the least from an ex post efficient cartel, 
since it can do nearly as well by producing on its own. Thus, the other 
firms should infer that a negative vote comes from a low-cost firm. In our 
private valuation model, this inference has the effect of reducing everyone 
else's output, since they expect high output from the disagreeing firm. The 
net effect, then, is to weaken the threat of disagreement, and therefore to 
reduce the set of enforceable cartels. That is, we conjecture that if the 
monopoly outcome is not enforceable with a passive inference from 
disagreement, it is still not enforceable with a durability restriction. 
8This informal discussion is in the spirit of Holmstrom and Myerson
[1983] and Crawford [1985], although it conforms with neither of their 
definitions of durability. 
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With a common value model, durability is likely to have the opposite 
effect. Firms infer that a firm voting against the cartel has a low signal, 
and therefore they expand their output, since it is likely that the true cost 
is lower than they originally suspected . This more aggressive response in 
the face of a negative vote strengthens the threat, and hence the set of 
enforceable cartels is expanded by durability arguments. Thus we would 
conj ecture that the monopoly outcome will be enforceable with a durability 
restriction, whenever it is enforceable with passive inference. 
Increasing Costs or Risk Aversion. With increasing costs or risk aversion, 
the characterization result in Theorem 1 becomes much more difficult, since 
linearity is lost . Some insights into analyzing this more complex problem 
may be gleaned from the literature on auction design with risk averse 
bidders, as in for example Maskin and Riley [1984b]. 
Regulated Cartel. The obj ective of a cartel in this paper is to maximize 
producer surplus . If instead the cartel is formed and regulated by the 
government, then it seems likely that both producer and consumer surplus 
would be given positive weight in the obj ective function . An analysis of 
this problem would extend the work of Baron and Myerson (1982] from one to 
several firms . 
Ex Ante Efficient Cartels . For the private costs model we were able to 
characterize under what circumstances an enforceable cartel can achieve the 
monopoly outcome, but when the monopoly outcome is not attainable, how much 
collusion is possible? Moreover, what cartel rules generate the largest 
industry profits? Another interesting question is whether the set of 
enforceable cartels converge to the competitive outcome as the number of 
firms goes to infinity ; that is, does the ability to collude vanish as the 
number of firms grows? 
3 3  
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